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Inherited Legal Systems and Effective Rule of Law: Africa and the Colonial Legacy
Sandra Fullerton Joireman1

Do particular types of legal institutions influence the effectiveness of the rule of law?
This is a question that scholars have long answered with conjecture. Common law
lawyers and judges tend to believe that the common law system is superior. This opinion
is based on the idea that the common law system inherited from the British is more able
to protect the rights of the individual than civil law judicial systems. Quite the opposite
point of view can be found in lawyers from civil law countries who may view the common
law system as capricious and disorganized. This paper compares the effectiveness of the
rule of law in common law and civil law countries in Africa. A cross- national statistical
comparison using Freedom House and Political Risk Services data is used.

The

comparison reveals that common law countries in Africa are generally better at
providing ‘rule of law’ than are civil law countries.

Effective colonization in Africa demanded a legal system to both maintain control
of a country and resolve disputes within it. Everywhere the colonial metropoles
established their own systems of law and dispute resolution, disregarding pre-existing

1

Thanks go to Shannon Hacker and Matt Jwayad for research assistance. I am grateful to, Christopher

Clapham, Pierre Englebert, Joel Horowitz, a reviewer for this journal who gave a particularly insightful set
of comments and the multitude of people who have given me comments as I have presented this paper. All
of the faults of the paper, including the recklessness of the topic, are my own.
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mechanisms of conflict resolution as primitive or appropriate for ‘natives’ only.2 Since
the establishment of colonial legal institutions, anthropologists and historians have
investigated the relationship between state and traditional law.

They have been

concerned with the dissonance between the institutional structures and patterns of
behavior prior to colonization and those that developed because of the presence of a
dominating foreign power. Much of this research has related to individual choices, for
example, the decision to have a complaint heard by a council of elders rather than a local
small claims court, or the recourse to traditional laws and customs when confronted with
modernizing forces such as land reform or agricultural commercialization. Beyond these
traditional vs. state institutional issues, lie another set of questions relating to African
legal systems and also rooted in the varied colonial experiences of the continent. These
questions pertain to the political detritus of colonization, to the customs and institutions
left when the colonial power withdrew. Of particular interest at the national level is the
performance and effectiveness of the various legal systems inherited from the metropoles.
Specifically, do the civil law institutions, inherited from the continental European powers
and the common law institutions inherited from Great Britain perform equally well in
assuring the rule of law in colonial Africa? More specifically, are civil law and common
law systems equally effective at preventing violent conflict and ensuring impartial access

2

Indeed, virtually all of the metropoles viewed it as their goal, if not obligation, to share their advanced

legal systems with their colonies. This type of thinking undergirded the whole colonial administration and
mission.
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to dispute resolution? The analysis presented in this paper will not fully answer these
questions, but address the answers provided by existing assessments of the rule of law.3
The effectiveness of legal institutions is an issue of importance to legal scholars,
academics, politicians and policy makers because it has long been suggested (and only
recently subjected to any rigorous test) that the rule of law is intricately connected to
democracy and capitalist development.4 Recent studies have suggested that individual
countries, insofar as they wish to grow economically should be concerned with the rule of
law and the effectiveness of their legal institutions (Engerman and Sokoloff 1998; Knack
and Keefer 1995). It is clear that strong legal institutions also assure a better human
rights record and deepen democracy within countries (Carrothers 1998; Coliver 2000).
Moreover, the efficacy of legal institutions is important to the international community as
well as within a nation’s borders. A country which is able to ensure its citizens physical
protection and equal treatment under the law is less likely to be engaged in violent
internal conflict and will not be, therefore, the source of potentially destabilizing refugee
flows (Dowty and Loescher 1996; Mandel 1997).
3

Let the reader beware. I make this distinction early in the paper so as to warn those who think definitive

conclusions are contained herein. They are not. What is present is a comparison of extant data that
examines the rule of law from particular, and some might argue, flawed points of view.
4

Though to what degree democracy and capitalist development are related is still a disputed area of

political science, see Jeffries, Richard (1993). There is also a theoretical argument regarding the role of
law in a society with Nicos Poulantzas (1973) and Antonio Gramsci (1971), arguing that law is inherently
political, involving the hegemonic control of the state over the society sometimes through persuasion
(Gramsci) and sometimes through domination in the articulation of law that favors the ruling classes and
limits the role of the state. John Rawls (1971) also argues that justice is always more than just the
impartial and regular administration of rules.
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This paper will first identify the differences between common law and civilian
legal systems and then discuss their establishment and development on the African
continent. The middle section of the paper will examine two cross-national data sets that
address the concept of rule of law. These data sets will be used to probe the issue of the
effectiveness of common law and civil law systems in countries that have been colonized.
The final section of the paper will offer some conclusions resulting from the data analysis
and the implications for African legal development.

Civil Law and Common Law
From the earliest days of their development there have been fundamental
differences between the English common law system and the continental European
systems of justice. The continental systems of law evolved out of the codes of the
Roman Empire and developed into a system of statutes that we now know of as civil law.
Perhaps because civil law developed in the context of an expanding empire in need of
regulation, civilian law is articulated in terms of the rights and duties of the citizen
(David and Brierley 1978). Civilian systems, such as that of the French, emphasize the
role of the individual within the state and apply the rights and duties of the citizen to a
particular case. The rights and responsibilities of the individual are believed to be
different in the public and private realms. Hence there is a division in civilian systems,
particularly those that are influenced by the French Napoleonic code, into distinct civil,
criminal and commercial codes.
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If we are to try and discern a difference in originating conceptions, it would be
that civilian systems begin with the idea of the state as supreme and the role of individual
in obedience to it. Alternatively, common law systems have developed with the idea of
the protection of individual rights from the state as a primary goal. This goal is achieved
through a particular process of investigation and decision-making. The common law was
developed as a procedure that if properly followed, would result in a judgment for the
plaintiff or defendant. The process, rather than the application of a code, leads to
justice. Perhaps due to the emphasis on process, the English legal system gives us the
idea of legal precedent and the reliance on the body of cases decided in the past to guide
the present decision of a judge. This allows for the development and flexibility of a legal
system over time. It is also this reliance on case law that appears so unorganized to
civilian lawyers (Merryman 1985). Employment of the common law is a methodology of
resolving disputes rather than the application of a particular rule.
In addition to these differences in the understanding of law in the two judicial
systems there is also a fundamental distinction in the way the two systems of law are
applied. The practice of English common law has been coupled with an adversarial
system of justice. An adversarial system, such as that which is in use in both the United
States and Britain is one in which the parties to a dispute are pitted against one another in
a relatively brief, oral contest with the expectation that competition between the two sides
will reveal the truth.5 The plaintiff, the defendant and lawyers representing them are
gathered together to present their case before a jury and a judge, who is expected to be an

5

Because of the oral argument in common-law systems they make for good television. The same cannot be

said of civilian systems in which the majority of the action takes place in a written format.
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impartial arbiter of justice.

This system is typified as adversarial because of the

oppositional relationship between the lawyers for the plaintiff and the defendant in the
trial.
Alternatively, the civilian, code based system of law has historically been coupled
with an inquisitorial system of practice. The inquisitorial system is characterized by the
unique role of judges who are required to gather evidence and question witnesses in order
to find truth. The inquisitorial system is also distinguished by the written nature of the
proceedings. Motions by the various sides must be made in writing to the judge, who
considers them and responds in writing. Witnesses are brought to testify before the judge
and lawyers in an intermittent fashion, rather than one right after another. A written
account of the testimony of witnesses is then presented at trial, if one occurs.

Lawyers

are involved in the inquisitorial system of justice, but as advisors to their clients rather
than as key actors in a trial.

One of the results of an inquisitorial application of the law

is that cases rarely go to trial unless the judge who conducted the investigation, is
convinced of the guilt of the accused and the preponderance of evidence that would
support that decision.6

Trials are simply reviews of the written record that has been

collected by the judge. Guilt and sentencing are then decided by a panel of judges or lay
assessors, though jury trials are also used for criminal matters. Thus, common law and
civil law systems of justice are distinct in the way the law is applied.7
6

Judges in civil law systems are specially trained to fulfill the role of investigators. The judge who hears

the case is not the same one who lead the investigation and jury trial are often used in criminal cases.
7

There are examples of civilian countries, such as Italy, that are moving towards an adversarial method of

applying the law because of a back-log of cases and the tedious and drawn out method of conducting an
investigation with an inquisitorial model. This is, however, controversial. Others such as Gordon Tullock
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Some scholars in Great Britain and America have suggested that common law
systems are superior due to their origins. The systems evolved to support different
purposes. English common law developed to protect the property of individuals and limit
the power of the state to expropriate resources. Civil law, in the Roman tradition, on the
other hand, developed as an instrument for expanding and administering the empire. It
was, in effect, a tool used by the state to regulate its citizens rather than to protect them
from the encroachment of the state.
Another reason identified in the belief of the superiority of the common law over
civil law is the role that lawyers play in common law systems. The role of lawyers in
former British colonies has traditionally been much stronger and more influential than in
former French colonies and is given as part of the explanation for stronger legal
institutions in those countries colonized by the British and adopting British institutions.
Merillat observes that, “In many former British territories lawyers have typically played
an important role in independence movements and, in the post-independence period, have
continued to occupy positions of prestige and power in the government and civil service”
(Merillat 1966:72).

Lawyers and strong law associations can provide an important

alternative locus of power to the state, thereby increasing the chances for democratic
development and a thriving civil society.8 Lawyers played a tremendously important role
in Ghana in the period leading up to independence as well as after. They organized in an

(1997) argue against the common law and adversarial system because of the lack of efficiency in
processing cases.
8

Lawyers and bar associations may not always play such a positive role. In Pakistan, for example, the bar

has been strongly criticized for corruption and its role in funneling money to judges in order to influence
their decisions.
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attempt to gain more representation in the colonial government and push Britain towards
granting Ghanaian independence (Edsman 1979).9 This was not everywhere the same, in
Kenya lawyers associations were not active in their support of constitutionalism after
independence, but rather complicit with the government in trying to carve out some
position of societal power. Immediately following independence perhaps due to the fact
that it was monopolized by expatriates during the years of colonization, the bar did not
developed a strong position of advocacy for the Kenyan people (Ghai and McAuslan
1970). This situation has changed in recent decades and the Law Society of Kenya has
since taken an important role in trying to reign in abuses of government power and
corruption (Gathii 1999).
Other observers have argued that the common law system was superior in Africa
both because the courts acted as a check on the executive, as noted above, and because by
the time independence arrived on the African continent judicial review in some common
law systems had a long and stable history. France, on the other hand, had what some
have called a ‘timid’ system of judicial review (Fombad 1998:173) first introduced in the
1958 French Constitution and then exported to the newly independent African states in
the 1960s before it had even become fully rooted in France! Fombad notes that the net
effect of this system in francophone Africa was to further empower an executive that
already held too much strength. In effect making ‘the heads of states the supreme judges
of the constitutionality of the laws’ (Fombad 1998:185).

9

Though Edsman would argue lawyers were most influential prior to 1945 rather than post 1945 and we

can note a similarly influential role of lawyers in Nigeria and Gambia (Davidson 1992).
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One final explanation for any difference between the two systems is the
importance of the bureaucracy in civilian systems. The emphasis on the written argument
in the civil law institutions, alongside the bureaucratic demands that written motions,
written records of interviews and the necessity of keeping all of these documents in order
and safe before a case is brought to trial, demands an efficient bureaucracy for the proper
application of the law. While this may work well in Belgium and Germany, many
countries in Latin America and the developing world do not have efficient bureaucracies.
This was noted by the French as a problem in the administration of justice in West Africa
during the colonial era (Robert 1955). The lack of an efficient bureaucracy can mean a
system unable to apply the law and all of the consequent ramifications. The common
law, with its emphasis on oral argument, is somewhat less dependent on an effective
bureaucracy, at least with regard to the proceedings of a case.10
African legal systems have had a chance to adapt and change, becoming more
specifically suited to their particular environment (North and Thomas 1970; Stone Sweet
1999).

Indeed, African countries have now established law schools and university

programs for the training and education of lawyers and judges. There is now in each
African country, a cadre of trained legal professionals with extensive knowledge both of
the law and its specific application in their country.

The lessons learned from an

examination of the African cases as they approach a half century in existence are of great
consequence as they can be applied to other countries in the world, specifically the

10

This is of course, all a matter of degree. The loss of critical evidence and/or forms, briefs, etc. in either

system can have a determining effect on the outcome of a case in either system.
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former Soviet Central Asian states, which are embarking on institutional restructuring in
similarly resource deprived settings.

Colonial Law in Africa
Without exception in Africa, colonies adopted the legal system of the metropole
at independence. This occurred for two distinct reasons. First, throughout the entire
colonial experience, indigenous peoples were forced to live with a particular system,
either the continental civil codes or British common law.

At independence, what

experience of a national legal system existed was that designed by the continental
European powers or the British. Therefore, just as newly independent colonies chose to
keep the languages of the metropoles for the conduct of governmental activities, so too
they retained the legal and other political institutions left behind. Examining the French
African colonies Delavignette notes that at independence the same administrative core
was retained, ‘The machinery had changed hands but not the parts.’(Delavignette
1950:276) Gower notes a similarity in English speaking Africa where ‘English law was
applied without consideration of its suitability to local conditions’ (Gower 1967:29).
This is not because these systems were necessarily better than traditional African legal
systems, but rather because there was a lock-in that occurred, a particular path that
prevailed because of the earlier experience with a specific set of institutions (Arthur
1989; David 1985). It is this experience with and knowledge of a particular system of
law that led Senegal to adopt a civil code as late as 1960 that resembled the French and
rejected traditional and customary law (Le Roy 1994).

Those Africans who were

educated in the law, and there were few, were educated in the law of the metropolitan
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power. Closely related to this point is the second reason that African countries adopted
the institutions of the metropole; elites within the country became adept at negotiating the
common law or civilian structures and, as a result, had a vested interest in seeing them
continue. African elites became experts at working within each legal system, particularly
during the struggle for independence. It was to be expected that African leaders would
choose to pick up the reins of a system with which they were already familiar rather than
constructing something completely new. Indeed, in Nigeria and Kenya at independence,
the courts and legal systems became closer to English common law than they had been
under British colonial rule. This was largely due to the fact that the English colonial
government allowed special legal status to Muslims, minorities and people under
customary law.11 At independence, free Kenyan, Ghanaian Nigerian judiciaries were less
inclined to favor these distinctions with special rights though customary and sharia law
were still recognized (Cohen 1969; Ghai and McAuslan 1970; Woodman 1994).
Though certainly the dominant players, France and Great Britain were not the
only countries active in the scramble for Africa. Belgium, Germany, Portugal and Italy
all retained control of some part of the continent by the early 1900s. That changed after
World War I as Germany was forced to relinquish her colonies on the continent, German
Southwest Africa, Cameroon and Tanganyika, as a consequence of her defeat. Italian
colonies such as Italian Somaliland, Eritrea and Libya, experienced a similar fate after
World War II. Belgium, Italy and Germany all also had civilian legal systems as did
Portugal, which unlike the rest of the European powers, maintained control of its African
colonies until 1975.

11

See Chanock (1991a) for a discussion of the construction of customary law under colonial rule.
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The British believed that one of the greatest legacies of colonization was the
imposition of the ‘civilizing’ British judicial institutions (Ghai and McAuslan 1970:125).
Yet, civil law systems are considered superior in Europe where they are thought to be
both fairer and more efficient (Merryman 1985). There are even bold American scholars
such as Tullock (1997) who have crossed the continental divide and argued for the
superiority of civil law systems.
From the earliest dates of colonial administration in Africa, British colonies and
colonies of the continental European powers were exposed to the legal systems of the
metropoles. Though attempts were originally made to shield all but the citizens of the
metropole from the application of European law through the formation of ‘Native Courts’
and ‘customary law’; these actions were largely ineffective. Historians and legal scholars
now engage in a debate as to whether ‘customary law’ was truly indigenous or whether it
was formed in relation to European law, often as a response to colonialism and to the
encroachment of the colonial administration Chanock (1991), Mann and Roberts (1991)
and Snyder (1987) argue that customary law did not exist in a pristine state before the
arrival of the Europeans, but rather was both developed and demanded by the presence of
a colonizing power. Max Gluckman and others would disagree and offer documented
cases of indigenous African law (Davidson 1992; Gluckman 1955; Gluckman 1965;
Nadel 1947; Rattray 1923). In the early colonial period, before the turn of the 20th
century, when the administration of colonies in Africa typically was left to a small
number of locally based administrators or officials of one of the large trading companies
(Ghai and McAuslan 1970:128), law was applied on a fairly ad hoc basis in the African
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colonies. This was particularly true in the interior where even missionaries might be
called upon to serve as judges in disputes (Chanock 1991).
Almost immediately after attaining control of territory, the British established
courts where the common law was applied. They also created local ordinances. Yet, the
British courts were not well staffed by trained judges until the latter half of the nineteenth
century. British courts in the colonies began hearing cases and recording them, thus
establishing a body of case law that could subsequently be referenced (Mann and Roberts
1991:14). In theory, the application of the common law systems should be flexible and
evolve to accommodate the local environment. But the need for control of the colonies
took precedence over the flexible application of law.

The expressed intentions of the Colonial Office officials, and the slight but
significant variations in the wording of the successive reception statutes
suggest a continued interest by the Colonial Office that the received law
be applied flexibly to respond to local conditions. It was a frustrated
desire, brought to naught by a rigid adherence to English precedent and a
dogma of legal uniformity. Together these doctrines ensured that English
law as transplanted, far from accommodating to the specific problems of
the colonies, would be applied rigidly and uniformly in accordance with
English authorities (Seidman 1989:110).

15
Indeed, law and administration were regarded as inseparable, a view which
accounts for the early and vigorous attempts by the British to establish legal systems in
their colonies.
The most egregious application of law in the early colonial period of Africa was
perhaps the French indigénat which gave colonial officials the right to punish African
subjects on the spot with up to two weeks in prison as well as a cash penalty, if they
deemed there to be an offense (Mann and Roberts 1991:17). Although its use became less
frequent, the indigénat remained the law of the French colonies until 1944 (Marshall
1971). In the four Senegalese French communes the French civil code was applied to the
French and Africans alike. But, in the rest of the areas of these states and the other
French colonial territories there were two sets of codes: the statut civil français for
French citizens and the statut personnel for subjects. However, the statut civil was also
applied to subjects if a dispute involved either the colonial government or French
citizens.
Just as the different colonizing powers used various methods of administering
justice in the early decades of colonization, they continued to use divergent techniques
with the turn of the twentieth century and following. The British, following a policy of
indirect rule enacted a legal system in which they trained and employed Africans to
adjudicate disputes between Africans. Arguably this may have left British colonies better
off following independence as there was a cadre of experienced legal practitioners within
the British colonies. The use of traditional leaders for dispute resolution through
customary law was a responsibility that the leaders did not necessarily possess prior to
colonization.

In some areas of Africa, where kingdoms were well established, for
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example among the Ashanti and Barotse, not only was there a group of traditional leaders
who resolved disputes, there was often a well-formed body of law (Gluckman 1955;
Gluckman 1965; Nadel 1947; Rattray 1923). These were the optimal situations for the
British as they needed traditional leaders in order to make their policy of indirect rule
work. Where they did not find the leaders they needed, the British created them. The
empowerment of traditional leaders in this regard, almost all of them older men, had the
effect of marginalizing women and young men (Chanock 1991).

However, the role of

Africans as adjudicators in the ‘Native Court’ system was not paralleled by an equally
important role in the common law courts that served the whole country and particularly
the expatriate community. This meant that while Africans could serve as judges in
‘traditional’ settings, in many British colonies training in the law was restricted, some
have argued that this was a result of the fear of lawyers that the British developed after
watching lawyers lead the Indian nationalist movement (Ghai 1987:751). In Tanganyika,
for example, the colonial government had a policy of preventing Africans from receiving
scholarships in the law while at the same time requiring British law degrees in order to
become a lawyer.
…all the judges in Colonial Africa were non-African until the tag end of
the imperial era, when a few West African judges were appointed, all of
whom, however, were trained and qualified in England. This was hardly
accidental; the East African Protectorates (Court of Appeal) Order-inCouncil 1902, for example, specifically provided that any additional
member appointed (besides the High Court judges of Zanzibar and the
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Protectorates) had to be 'a member of the bar of England, Scotland or
Ireland, of not less than five years' standing' (Seidman 1989:111).

This British policy, coupled with the fact that there was no legal training
available in Tanganyika, meant that at independence there were only 25 lawyers in the
country and only two of them were Africans (Twaib 1997:33).

This lack of legal

professionals was true in most African countries with the exception of Ghana and
Nigeria, which had a small number of African lawyers working on customary issues such
as land and inheritance during the colonial period (Edsman 1979; Luckham 1987). In
Nigeria this was due to an allowance before 1945 for lawyers to practice law with no
degree as long as they had enrolled at one of the English Inns of Court and passed the bar
examination (Gbadamosi 2001). A similar situation prevailed in other British West
African colonies where private money fueled the education of a small cadre of legal
professionals (Ghai 1987:752).
In the case of the French colonies, the judicial and administrative apparati
changed significantly at two points in French colonial history.

At the turn of the

twentieth century the first change occurred as the French shifted from a position of trying
to peacefully coexist with African customs and traditions to an explicit attempt to change
African traditions and customs so as to promote economic production and strengthen
French control over the empire (Okou 1994). Another shift occurred after the Second
World War, when the French colonial administration eliminated the indigénat entirely
and developed a code indigene, which was supposed to protect African customs while
promoting the advancement or ‘evolution’ of the African legal systems. However as one
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French scholar aptly noted, the intentions of the French to promote the development of a
specifically African legal system which would be better suited to the colonies was likely
lost on the African population. ‘Mais, ce qui est le plus grave, c’est l’incompréhension
parfois totale des peuples africains sur nos intentions’(Robert 1955:205).
Belgium and Portugal, both countries with civil law systems, were also negligent
in training qualified indigenous professionals in the law. As Belgian and Portuguese
colonies became independent they had virtually no trained legal professionals to handle
disputes in the national court system. In Angola, in 1968, before the country became
independent, the total number of practicing lawyers (and one assumes here that all or
most are Portuguese) in the country was 87 (Bender 1978:231). At independence every
colony had a need for experienced legal professionals if people were to have access to the
judicial system as a method of resolving disputes. The fact that so little attention was
given to building the judiciary and the legal profession in the colonies prior to
independence had two immediate consequences. The first, was the obvious impediment
that weak and nascent legal systems posed to the use of the courts as a nonviolent
solution to conflict and as arbiters of contractual disputes. The second, less obvious, but
malignant consequence of the weak judiciary and legal profession was that they in no
way could serve as a foil to the concentration of power in the hands of the central state
and the executive.12

The lack of a powerful or even a stable legal profession and

judiciary in most African countries at independence combined with the impetus for the

12
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concentration of power in the executive made authoritarian rule an inevitability in postcolonial Africa.
It is the intent of this paper to compare the legal legacy of the continental and
common law institutions in African countries. Are common law countries in Africa and
elsewhere truly better at providing the ‘rule of law’ than civil law countries? This
assumption will provide the basis for the null hypothesis; that civil legal systems and
common law systems are relatively approximate in their ability to provide effective rule
of law.

Comparing the Legal Systems
In the following section I will evaluate and interpret the correlation between a
particular system of legal institutions and the rule of law as measured by the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating system distributed by Political Risk Services
(Syracuse, NY) and the Freedom House assessments of civil liberties. Both of these
measures assess a certain set of characteristics of a country and give it a numeric tag to
signify its ranking in relation to other countries.

Measures of this sort can be

idiosyncratic, dependent on the assessments of a particular researcher or team (Cheibub
1999).

Moreover, they are inevitably the impressions of elites within the country or

reports from expatriate scholars and businesspeople. I am using both the ICRG ratings
and the Freedom House assessment to arrive at more robust conclusions that are less
vulnerable to this accusation.13 It should be noted that both of these ratings originate in

13

By less vulnerable I do not mean invulnerable, as these problems are pernicious and difficult to eradicate.

One need only reflect on the difficulty of getting a similar and accurate measure from the perspective of the
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America and therefore may have a common law bias.14 Because I am using the indices of
two established data sets rather than constructing my own, I am confined to the use of
their particular definitions of rule of law. I have indicated how these are defined in the
section below, but would like to note before beginning that the definition of ‘rule of law’
is particularly vexing and ultimately vacuous as it can mean anything from a ‘state’s
commitment to provide its citizens with legal remedies against unlawful exertions of state
power,’ (Collier and Starr 1989:15) to simply good government (LaPorta et al. 1998). To
avoid confusion and maintain the integrity of the conclusions of this paper, then, I make
no wider claims or definitive statements herein than to compare these measures using the
criteria stated by both Political Risk Services (ICRG) and Freedom House.
The ICRG rating system consists of a panel data set on political, financial and
economic risk in selected countries from the early 1980s through to 1997. Among other
purposes, this data set evaluates the effectiveness of rule of law in many countries around
the world. The ICRG rating includes variables assessing a county’s law and order
tradition and corruption in government. The dataset includes at least 32 African countries
and has recently been used in the work of several scholars to determine the impact of law
on the economy (Keefer and Knack 1995; Poirson 1998). Two specific variables will be
examined. The first rates the rule of law in a country as indicated by the strength of the
court system, the reliance on the use of physical force or illegal means to settle disputes
and the provision for an orderly succession of power (Political Risk Services 1996). A

working class in any developed country to understand the problems inherent in these measures. However,
as we have no others, it is worth examining what these measures tell us.
14

To the best of my knowledge there is no such measure that is generated from a government or research

organization in a civil law country.
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low rule of law rating (countries are rated on a categorical scale of 0-6) means that there
is more reliance on the physical use of force and/or illegal means to settle conflict. The
second variable is that which measures corruption.

The specific definition of this

variable is the degree to which ‘…high government officials are likely to demand special
payments, and illegal payments are generally accepted throughout the society’ (Political
Risk Services 1996). Lower ratings (again on a categorical scale of 0-6) are assigned to
countries that are generally nondemocratic and in which the government has been in
power for more than 10 years. While the reasons for using the rule of law variable are
obvious, the justification for the use of the corruption variable may be less so. We
assume that to the extent corruption exists in a society (and can be measured) it will stand
as an impediment to the proper functioning of institutions. Landes (1997) and others
have noted this fact. We would, therefore expect to see a strong correlation between
corruption and rule of law variables. Additionally, corruption is included in the Freedom
House Civil Liberties rating, so examining Rule of Law and Corruption scores together
give the best equivalent to the Freedom House Civil Liberties rating.
The Freedom House Civil Liberties rating is an annual assessment of political and
civil rights in countries around the world. It rates at least 48 African countries from 1973
through 1998.15 Freedom House rates countries in three categories, civil liberties,
political rights and a freedom rating which is a combination of the previous two statistics.
Of all of the Freedom House ratings, the civil liberties rating comes the closest to being
comparable to the ICRG Political Risk Services ratings on both rule of law and

15

The data actually extend to the present, but I have truncated them at 1998 to make them correspond better

to the ICRG data which end in 1997.
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corruption. The civil liberties variable is also an ordinal ranking based on the degree to
which civil liberties are allowed in a country. In assessing civil liberty scores for a
country Freedom House evaluates whether or not there is a free and independent
judiciary; whether the ‘rule of law prevails in civil and criminal matters’; and whether
‘there is protection from political terror, and from unjustified imprisonment, exile or
torture whether by groups that support or oppose the system’ (Karatnycky 1998:18).
The civil liberties rating also includes factors such as gender equality, freedom of
movement and freedom of the media and expression, variables which go beyond what we
wish to consider in this paper. Therefore the Freedom House rating is less precise than
the ICRG assessments. The issue of government corruption is also evaluated in the
Freedom House civil liberty rating as ‘Government corruption can pervert the political
process and hamper the development of a free economy’ (Karatnycky 1998:18). The
civil liberties rating is ordinal, ranging from 1 to 7 with seven being the worst possible
score and 1 being the highest. Since the ICRG data were ranked from 0 to 6 with six
being the best possible score a country could receive, I transformed the Freedom House
rating to make 7 the best possible score and 1 the worst possible score. Doing so makes
the data more comparable.

Examining the Data
ICRG Rule of Law data for common law and civil law countries are presented in the
two figures below. These figures are not consistent enough to allow conclusions in and
of themselves, but we can make some observations by just looking at them.
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Figure 1 here

Figure 2 here

The first thing that becomes immediately apparent upon looking at these two graphs
is that civil law countries in Africa follow a more consistent trend than common law
countries in Africa. Lower Rule of Law scores in the late 1980s plateau in the late 1980s
followed by a dip in the statistic for most civil law countries with the end of the Cold War
in about 1990. From that point forward the scores scatter across the measure with the
North African countries of Morocco and Tunisia scoring comparatively high and troubled
war-torn countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Algeria and Angola
scoring at the lower end of the scale.
Trends in common law countries are far less obvious to the eye. While it is clear that
the end of the Cold War brought a general rise in the Rule of Law scores in countries
such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, Malawi, Uganda and the Gambia, there are countries such
as Botswana and Tanzania that perform consistently throughout the time period. In
addition to these two groups of countries there is a third group with inconsistent Rule of
Law scores. Egypt and South Africa both have measures that rise and fall inconsistently,
not surprising given the internal political problems in these two countries; South Africa
with the fall of apartheid and the changing expectations of the new regime and Egypt
with the struggle against Islamic fundamentalist groups within the country.
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Examining the data over time in this fashion is interesting, but inconclusive. It can
show us the complexity and variety of and between countries as well as indicating the
problems with putting all civil law and common law countries together in the same
category. Yet, I will be proceeding to do just that below in order to correctly identify any
overarching trends that may exist. In the next section the data are analyzed statistically
by comparing the mean scores and examining the variance within each group of
countries.

Comparing the Data for Civil Law and Common Law Countries
The Freedom House and ICRG data are used below to test the null hypothesis that
there is no difference between the rule of law, corruption and civil liberties scores for
civil law and for common law countries. I tested the hypothesis using a nonparametric
test for two independent samples on SPSS statistical software and evaluated the data
through the use of the Mann-Whitney U statistic, which is an analysis of variance test for
non-parametric data.16 It was necessary to use the Mann-Whitney U rather than the
standard ANOVA technique because the data used was ordinal and not normally
distributed. Instead of a normal distribution there tended to be more data points in the

16

This technique is better than using regression analysis because we know and acknowledge that the effect

of income on a country’s rule of law score is both positive and significant. The question left to answer is
whether a particular type of system influences the rule of law at all levels of income. We can also identify
two independent groups in which we are concerned with the distribution of scores, rather than specific
causality.
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higher values and virtually none in the lowest.17 The Mann-Whitney test assigns ranks to
all of the available scores for the two groups of data then detects the number of times a
data point from Group A precedes a data point from Group B. It also reports on the rank
sums and on the means of both sets. The idea behind the test is that if the two groups are
approximately equal in location then the ranks should be randomly mixed between the
two samples. If the null hypothesis, that the samples are similar, is true, then the average
rank sums and the average means should be about equal and the significance statistics in
the last two columns of the table should be greater than .05. Where these significance
statistics are at or below .05 we can be 95% certain that the two samples of civil and
common law countries are not alike.
Figure 3 here

There was no significant difference in the ICRG Rule of Law and Corruption
scores for civil law and common law countries in Africa when all years were examined
together. However, after 1990 there is a significant difference in ICRG Rule of Law
scores between the two sets of countries. An examination of the mean ranks and the sum
of ranks will show that the common law countries are doing better at assuring rule of law
in Africa according to the ICRG rating. The Freedom House Civil Liberties rating

17

An interesting effect partially caused by the fact that those countries which ranked near the bottom of

both assessments because of their poor rule of law records had mixed system of law, i.e. Islamic and
common or Islamic and civil and were, therefore, dropped from the sample as their institutional structure
was neither truly civil nor truly common law.
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showed significant differences between the two groups when all years were analyzed but
not after 1990. Thus the two measures are indicating divergent trends with Freedom
House identifying less difference between the two groups of countries after 1990 and the
ICRG data identifying more divergence between the two.

It is difficult to say

conclusively why this might be the case. However, as the Freedom House Civil Liberties
measure is a catch all for everything from the independence of the judiciary to the
equality of women in the society it could be capturing some societal change outside of
the rule of law. The ICRG measure is far more specific to our interests here.
As a second step I included in the data set all countries that have been colonized
rather than just those in Africa. The intention in doing so was to see how Africa
compared to the rest of the colonized world. Figure 4 displays the results.
Figure 4 here

Data analyzed from the set of colonized countries demonstrates that when we
examine all available data together, the African cases reflect a trend. Overall, there is a
significant difference in ICRG Rule of Law and Freedom House Civil Liberties ratings in
colonized countries with common law countries having significantly higher scores on
average. This is true for all colonized countries, for those that became independent after
1949, for those that became independent prior to 1949 and for countries both before and
after the Cold War (Joireman 1999). However, the data presented in Figure 3 show that
African common law countries do not seem to be as effective at providing civil liberties
according to the Freedom House measure in either time period analyzed. The same could
be said of civil law countries, which not only show a significant difference in the
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Freedom House category, but also in the ICRG Rule of Law ratings after 1990 where
they are significantly worse on average than in other colonized countries.

Figure 5 here

The data indicate two identifiable trends. First, at the aggregate level, using the
measures of rule of law and corruption that we have discussed above, common law
systems appear to be better at providing the rule of law than are civil law systems.
Second, this is increasingly the case in Africa as well. After 1990, there is a significant
difference between the effectiveness of civil law systems in Africa and elsewhere
according to the ICRG Rule of Law ratings and the less specific Freedom House civil
liberties rating. Somewhat surprisingly Africa did not come out as statistically worse in
terms of its ICRG Corruption rating in any time period or category.

Possible explanations
African common and civil law systems show a similarity to colonized countries in
other parts of the world with common law countries appearing more effective in their
provision of the Rule of Law and civil law countries worse in Africa and worse overall on
average. Why might this be the case? We know the African continent is unique in
having many countries with low GNP/capita, and we can posit several ways in which a
low GNP/capita might interfere with the provision of legal services and ultimately affect
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the rule of law as it is defined by both Political Risk Services and Freedom House. The
more money a country has, the better its judiciary will be trained and paid, and the
stronger the judicial institutions will be overall. Economic historians, such as Douglass
North and Robert Thomas (1993) have noted that a rising level of income in a country
will lead to more complex and efficient institutions.18 Closely related to the issue of
national wealth, is that of personal wealth. Lawyers cost money and good lawyers cost a
lot of money. If justice can be bought then in countries with low levels of personal
wealth, there will be little justice. Where people do not have the resources to litigate
injustices may exist unchecked by the law.
A second reason why we may see the poor performance of civil law systems in Africa
relates very closely to the historical discussion in the first part of this paper. The legal
profession in both civil and common law African countries was not fully developed at
independence and legal professionals are critical to the functioning of any legal system.
When independence was achieved many African states had a very small number of
African layers, limited if any legal education and a dual court system. The dual court
system, which allowed for the functioning of ‘native courts’ applying customary law and
using individuals not trained in civil or common law as judges was particularly harmful
to the formation of a politically active bar after independence. The use of native courts
was typically jettisoned by the independent African nations. Few wanted to retain the
notion that one type of law was for Africans and another for Europeans and the well
18

This is one of the reasons why any multiple regression analysis will demonstrate that both civil and

common law institutions are more effective at higher levels of income. In fact, if we include in our sample
countries such as France and Belgium, which have not been colonized, the differences between the two
groups of cases disappear.
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educated. Thus, the pattern was for countries to apply common or civil law justice to all
peoples while trying to integrate the important aspects of customary law into the legal
system. Thus, the legal profession at independence had several concerns: to develop
some means of legal education; to adapt to a new court system; and to recruit new
lawyers and judges into the field.19

Typically, it was not large enough in terms of

membership, nor strong enough in political power to provide an effective parry to
government attempts to expand the role of the state or the power of the executive.
I have made an argument as to why the legal profession could not provide an
alternative focus of political power in the newly independent era, but most African
countries have been independent for 50 years. What about recent decades? Have bar
associations and the judicial branches of African countries played a more active role
politically? This certainly seems to be the case in Kenya where the Law Society, which
was co-opted by the state in the early years of independence (Ghai and McAuslan 1970)
is now active in trying to restrain the power of the government and fighting corruption
(Gathii 1999). Jennifer Widner (1999) has examined the changing role of the judiciary
in common law Africa. She argues that the attempt by the judiciary to influence politics
in a more democratic fashion is underway, but it is often constrained by partisan pressure
in its bid for greater independence. In Widner’s research in three common law countries
in Africa, 73.9 percent of lawyers in Tanzania and 78.9 percent of lawyers in Uganda
identified the judiciary as more independent than ten years ago while only 3.2 percent of
lawyers in Bostwana thought the same. Widner was not attempting to identify the role
of the bar in particular, but her research illustrates some improvement in judicial

19

Ghai (1987) discusses the different strategies and effectiveness of West African countries in so doing.
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independence over the past decade. Common law countries in Africa do seem to be
making gains relative to civil law countries in these ICRG assessments. Figure 6 below
illustrates the growing divergence between the paths of civil law and common law
countries in the ICRG assessments.

Figure 6 here

If Widner’s research and the experience of Kenya are at all indicative of trends, and that
much remains to be seen, we can expect this gap to grow.
What are the explanations for this divergence in the African civil and common
law countries? The issue of bureaucratic effectiveness mentioned in the earlier part of the
paper seems the most convincing explanation at this point.

Insofar as the proper

functioning of a bureaucracy can impact the effectiveness of a legal system, the existence
of an underpaid and inefficient bureaucracy can have devastating effects on the
application of justice. If there is a greater reliance on the bureaucracy in an inquisitorial
system under the civil law then there will be a less effective application of the law. My
own experiences working in the legal archives in Ethiopia and Eritrea, both civil law
countries, lead me to believe that this is a salient and understudied issue. Witnessing the
long duration of some cases20, the effort needed to ensure that each legal document was
filed in the proper office with the correct stamp, and the multitudinous reasons for the
delay of a hearing, I became convinced that the process of acquiring a legal verdict was
tremendously expensive in terms of both money and opportunity costs.

20

I have documentation of land tenure cases that lasted as long as six years.

Whether

31
common law systems are more effective because they rely less on bureaucratic processes
remains to be proven in further research.

Conclusions
Colonization mattered. In all countries, it provided an overall legal, institutional
system to African states at independence, however colonial metropoles nowhere trained a
sufficient number of lawyers and judges to take the leadership of this institutional system.
Therefore at independence there existed a political paradox of elites with vested interests
in the continuation of the particular legal institutional setting, but no real personnel or
infrastructure to maintain that system. Numerous African and Africanist scholars have
noted this fact (Bender 1978; Ghai and McAuslan 1970; Twaib 1997, Ghai 1987).
Moreover, because of profound changes that were made to each legal system at
independence, typically in an attempt to allow all citizens access to a legal structure that
had previously been reserved for the expatriates, we cannot really speak of the legal
system as existing in its current form prior to independence. Therefore, an analysis of the
development and effectiveness of African legal institutions after independence is both
wholly appropriate and theoretically compelling. Indeed, the conclusions from the crossnational data presented here are intriguing insofar as they indicate a similarity of African
cases with trends around the world and significantly worse civil law systems. This is
particularly important given the fact that in the African cases we are comparing like to
like, the civil law and common law countries have similar political challenges and
resource endowments. From the data analyzed here, it appears that as a group African
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common law systems have become more effective over time while the civil law systems
have remained stagnant.
Time may increase the effectiveness of both civil and common law systems in
Africa. If legal training and the strengthening of the judiciary have the potential to
increase the rule of law then we should see an improvement over the next few decades as
many programs have been developed by USAID and the World Bank to “strengthen” the
judiciary in the developing world (Coliver 2000; Gathii 1999).21
If ever there was a needful call for further research it is in this area of the
effectiveness of legal institutions. We need more indigenous, scholarly assessments of
the effectiveness of law and legal systems in Africa, and for that matter in the rest of the
developing world, in order to determine which institutions and strategies work best in
countries with low income levels. Moreover, it is essential that we develop more broadly
comparative research in this area rather than research targeted at either civil or common
law countries with similar institutions. With all of the international aid money flowing
into projects aimed at ‘strengthening’ legal institutions, we should know more about what
is being strengthened and the processes of the application of justice in Africa and the rest
of the developing world.

21

Gathii addresses the underlying theoretical premises of these programs and their effectiveness in the

African context from a theoretical perspective.
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Figure 1

Rule of Law Scores in African Common Law Countries
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Figure 2

Rule of Law Scores in African Civil Law Countries
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Figure 3

Mann-Whitney Test of Legal Systems in Africa
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Figure 4

Mann-Whitney U Test of all Common Law and Civil Law countries
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Figure 5

Mann-Whitney test on all colonized countries
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